سبد خرید

Managerial entrenchment and earnings management

Agency theorists have long contended that managerial entrenchment is detrimental for shareholders, because it protects managers from the discipline of corporate governance. However, as a competing hypothesis, we argue that entrenchment can also provide benefits for the firm’s owners: it leads managers to be less myopic in managing earnings to meet short-term financial reporting goals. Our findings are consistent with this prediction as they suggest that, when there are incentives to manipulate firms’ performance, entrenched managers are less prone to engage in earnings management activities that hurt shareholders. Specifically, we focus on firms that just meet or marginally beat earnings benchmarks and document a negative association between managerial entrenchment and both the opportunistic use of accruals and the manipulation of real activities. We also show that earnings management is less detrimental to firm value if the manager is entrenched. Finally, we find that these effects of entrenchment on earnings management are only present for firms domiciled in Delaware.

The effect of cash flow forecasts on accrual quality and benchmark beating

When analysts provide forecasts of both earnings and operating cash flow, they also implicitly provide a forecast of total operating accruals. We posit that this increases the transparency and the expected costs of accrual manipulations used to manage earnings. As a consequence, we predict and find that accrual quality improves and firms’ propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks declines following the provision of cash flow forecasts. We also predict and find that firms turn to other benchmark-beating mechanisms, such as real activities manipulation and earnings guidance in response to the provision of cash flow forecasts.

Detecting earnings management with neural networks

A large body of studies has examined the occurrence of earnings management in various contexts. In most studies, the assumption has been that earnings are managed through accounting accruals. Thus, a range of accrual based earnings management detection models have been suggested. The ability of these models to detect earnings management has, however, been questioned in a number of studies. An explanation to the poor performance of the existing models is that most models use a linear approach for modeling the accrual process even though the accrual process has in fact proven non-linear in several studies. An alternative way to deal with the non-linearity is to use various types of neural networks. The purpose of this study is to assess whether neural network-based models outperform linear and piecewise linear-based models in detecting earnings management. The study comprises neural network models based on a self-organizing map (SOM), a multilayer perceptron (MLP) and a general regression neural network (GRNN). The results show that the GRNN-based model performs best, whereas the linear regression-based model has the poorest performance. However, the results also show that all five models assessed in this study estimate discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings management, with some bias.

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from nonforecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.

Audit quality and Earnings Management in Quoted Nigerian Banks

The objective of the study is to find out the impact of audit quality on earnings management. The study used a sample of all eighteen banks quoted on the stock exchange as at December, 2010. Data was gathered for the period 2005 to 2010. The cross-sectional year by year regression analysis was performed. Audit quality is measured by using audit fees and auditor change, and abnormal loan loss provision is used to measure earnings management. Though the result was mixed, however, based on the frequency of results for the period of the study, both audit fee and auditor change were positively related to abnormal loan loss provision. This suggests that high audit fee and change in auditor tenure will aggravate earnings management. We recommend that auditor change should not be ceremonial but based on fact of inefficiency and audit fee from each auditor client should be monitored to enforce the five per cent maximum from each client as suggested by Institute of Chartered Accountants code of ethics.

Auditor industry specialization, board governance, and earnings management

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction effect of auditor industry specialization and board governance on earnings management. This study examines whether board independence is more or less effective in constraining earnings management for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by non-specialists. Design/methodology/approach – The US data were collected from the RiskMetrics Directors database and the Compustat database. Regression analysis was used to test the research proposition. Findings – It was found that earnings management is more negatively associated with board independence for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by non-specialists, consistent with the notion that there is a complementary relationship between auditor industry specialization and board governance. The findings suggest a positive interaction effect of auditor industry specialization and board governance on accounting quality .Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature by documenting explicit evidence that high quality boards can be more effective through hiring industry specialist auditors. This study also suggests that it may be worth investigating the interaction effect among different corporate governance mechanisms on accounting quality

Auditor reputation and earnings management: International evidence from the banking industry

We examine the relation between auditor reputation and earnings management in banks using a sample of banks from 29 countries. In particular, we examine the implications of two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type and auditor industry specialization, for earnings management in banks. We find that both auditor type and auditor industry specialization moderate benchmark-beating (loss-avoidance and just- meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings) behavior in banks. In addition, we find that once auditor type and auditor industry specialization are included in the same tests, only auditor industry specialization has a significant impact on constraining benchmark-beating behavior. In separate tests related to income- increasing abnormal loan loss provisions, we find that both auditor type and auditor expertise constrain income-increasing earnings management. Again, in joint tests, only auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on constraining income-increasing earnings management

The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud

This paper provides new evidence on the characteristics of firms that commit financial statement fraud. We examine how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial statement fraud and in doing so develop three new fraud predictors. Using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 nonfraud firms, we find that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years and that earnings management in prior years is associated with a higher likelihood that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts or that inflate revenue are committing fraud. We further find that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms are even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. This paper contributes to the fraud detection literature and the earnings management literature, and can help practitioners and regulators develop better fraud detection models.

The Impact of Earnings Management on the Extent of Disclosure and True Financial Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Hong Kong

This paper challenges the notion that seeking to increase disclosure may not necessarily improve firm performance. Using Hong Kong listed firms subject to increase the extent of disclosure, this paper shows that the net benefit of disclosure is contingent on conditions such as the quality and integrity of a firm’s information. We demonstrate that a nonlinear relation exists between disclosure and firm performance when measured performance is adjusted for the impact of earnings management, over the period from 2006 to 2013. The results of our study show that corporate disclosure is likely to result in benefits, but after an optimum level, increasing disclosure reduces true firm performance. This optimum level also falls when differences between other firm’s monitoring environments (e.g., independent boards) are in place. These results indicate that intense monitoring of CEOs offsets the advantage of additional corporate disclosure.

The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud

This paper provides new evidence on the characteristics of firms that commit financial statement fraud. We examine how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial statement fraud and in doing so develop three new fraud predictors. Using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 nonfraud firms, we find that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years and that earnings management in prior years is associated with a higher likelihood that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts or that inflate revenue are committing fraud. We further find that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms are even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. This paper contributes to the fraud detection literature and the earnings management literature, and can help practitioners and regulators develop better fraud detection models.

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